By Roberto Diodato & Silvia Benso & John Protevi & Justin L. Harmon
Reconfigures vintage aesthetic ideas relating to the newness brought by way of digital bodies.
Arguing that the digital physique is whatever new—namely, an entity that from an ontological standpoint has just recently entered the world—Roberto Diodato considers the implications of this sort of physique for aesthetics. digital our bodies insert themselves into the distance spread out through the well-known contrast in Aristotle’s Physics among common and synthetic beings—they are either. they're beings which are at the same time occasions; they're photographs which are straight away inner and exterior; they're ontological hybrids that exist merely within the interplay among logical-computational textual content and human our bodies endowed with technological prostheses. Pursuing this line of concept, Diodato reconfigures vintage aesthetic options reminiscent of mimesis, illustration, the relation among phantasm and truth, the character of pictures and mind's eye, and the idea of sensory wisdom
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Additional info for Aesthetics of the Virtual
In brief, I believe that if we avoid thinking of the self as ego, as a more or less decentralized yet in some way creative [being], and instead conceive of it as an interactive function, then we may be able to bring together some suggestions and construct an analogy among forms of presence. But we still have to go some way before we reach this result. The “sensation” of presence is indeed a peculiar characteristic of dreams: dreams are environments in which we participate in an immersive manner, in which we are not spectators, but actors.
The problem is that the mind is made to keep up with changes in the world, not to create them from scratch or from chaos. Whereas the novelist maintains and constantly updates an external memory (a canvas, a set of notes) to help him keep track of what happens to the characters and the world in which they move, the mind immersed in a dream can appeal only to its own internal memory resources and capacity for prediction. 54 Perhaps we can explain those very same traits that belong to dream experiences (immersion, intense quality of presence, incoherence) and avoid the hypothesis of unilateralism; dream aspects could simply depend upon the constitutive interaction between the subject’s avatar and a dynamic memory, which precisely belongs and does not belong specifically to the subject, or belongs to it while exceeding it in several directions, so that the dream world would be a complete integration of subject and environment.
Nor, for that matter, is it an icon or original image; rather, it is to be understood as a peculiar geneticrelational form. Thus, the digital image, at least in its strongest characterization, is not strictly speaking “image” but “subtle body,” a hybrid image-object entity, and its appearance, its existence as image, is essentially interactive. Let us now justify these observations, first of all in their effects with respect to some traditional categories in aesthetics, namely, representation and simulacrum.